Animal Spirits Pt. 3: Natural Wage Theory, Money Illusion, and Wages

I just finished reading Chapter 9 of Animal Spirits. Now I see the point of criticizing Natural Rate Theory. I mentioned in an earlier installment that I suspect that, over the long time, wages will tend to track inflation, but lag behind. Akerlof and Shiller appear to be saying that this is precisely the point. Steady inflation holds wages at a lower level, one which allows a lower level of unemployment. Employers can grant employees raises for the financial purpose of keeping it in line with the purchasing power of money, while still giving the employee the feeling that they are being rewarded for their efforts. In the absence of inflation, the employer can't afford to give so many raises, the employee feels he's not being treated fairly, and worker productivity falters. So, in their analysis, because of money illusion and fairness, a certain level of inflation is required to keep productivity up.

Outside factors they failed to take into account (which I will get into below), I can find no fault with their analysis. Particularly in a world in which people have, over multiple generations, come to regard raises as a regular obligation, perceived unfairness (that very phrase is redundant, given all fairness is subjective) could well result in productivity losses in the absence of inflation-motivated raises.

Of course, this likely leads to the recommendation that a level of inflation should be maintained at all times. Further, it makes something like a commodity money seem untenable. However, there is something else to put into the analysis: the credit cycle. Wages are downwardly rigid, therefore deflation can damage employment levels, as falls in wages fail to keep pace with falls in other prices. But what if "fractional reserve" banking were abolished, and therefore the bank created inflation that ultimately leads to deflation never occurred in the first place? The downward rigidity of wages could become irrelevant, in this scenario. But then, it could also lead to an extended (possibly multigenerational, meaning it would be politically unsustainable in reality) period of adjustment, until people finally realized psychological satisfaction is not going to come from making the numbers bigger.

It's a big hurdle to get over. From a strictly logical standpoint, wages generally rising over time, but lagging behind prices is not as good for workers as wages falling slowly but lagging behind prices. But falling prices, though it is good for a person whose wages have not yet fallen, is an impersonal phenomenon. Rising wages, though, feel like a personal reward, even if the employer is only keeping the wage in line with rising prices, and even lagging behind. The gradual price drops of a stable money supply may be better for workers materially, but rising wages, even insufficient to cover rising prices, are more emotionally satisfying.

Were it not for the dangers inherent in a fiat token-based (whether paper or digital) currency (which we are seeing today, as the results of bad monetary policy hit the economy like a hurricane), a fiat currency would definitely be better... IF the money supply expanded evenly. Unfortunately for fiat money supporters, it does not. Industries grow beyond what they should because of investment bubbles, and then people lose their savings, workers lose time building knowledge and experience in bad industries (not to mention their jobs for no good reason), people lose confidence (which the authors just spent a chapter talking about). I'm presently convinced the negatives of fiat money and an inflationary policy outweigh the negatives.

That, and I have moral difficulties with the idea of a monetary elite making things better by deliberately deceiving laborers.

Animal Spirits Pt. 2: Money Illusion

I am unfamiliar with the term "money illusion", but from what I'm gathering from this chapter as I read it, this refers to the failure by many people to account for changes in the purchasing power of money in their financial planning. In short, the term "money illusion" is kind of like the inverse of another term I am familiar with, "Neutrality of money". Most economists operation under the assumption that money is a neutral medium of exchange. Akerlof and Shiller, in advocating a return to the idea of "money illusion", appear to be saying something similar to what is said in Misesian circles: that money is not neutral.

As evidence of this money illusion, the authors point out that the vast majority of labor contracts fail to include wage increases to account for cost-of-living increases. In other words, in the vast majority of cases, workers bargain in monetary terms, not in "real" terms. But, there is another explanation other than "money illusion". It could be that both sides are simply less concerned with future prices than they were with current prices. The workers want to get as much as they can right now, gambling that future negotiations will enable them to keep up with the costs of living. The employers want to avoid built-in cost increases, and gamble that future negotiations will enable them to avoid excessive wage increases. Since nobody can truly predict the future, neither side can effectively negotiate in terms of future wages.

Then again, that whole argument could be the same thing as "money illusion". I'm still not sure what it means, exactly.

Still, if it is true that, as Akerlof and Shiller assert, conventional economists (I suspect they are referring to monetarists here) actually make the assumption that people see through the veil of inflation naturally... I weep for the profession. I suspect, however, that there is more to it than this.

In the sort term, of course many people are going to fail to account for inflation. People differ in their degree of financial savvy. Furthermore, people who maintain minimal savings have little to lose from inflation (aside from wage erosion, but those are not entirely under their control in the first place), and thus have little incentive or opportunity to think in terms of inflation. So if monetarists, when they say people behave "rationally" and "see past" inflation (in the authors' words), actually mean people are smart and know about inflation... obviously they fail. Hard.

However, though wages for unskilled labor will always tend to lag behind inflation, they will also tend to track inflation, quite in spite of the worker's lack of knowledge about inflation. For workers are not aiming at a specific level of "real wages". They are simply trying to get as much value out of their jobs as possible (including money, but also including such intangibles as job satisfaction, job security, risk aversion both physical and psychological, etc.). Likewise, their employers are not trying to maintain some specific "real value" in their wage rates, but are rather, day to day, simply trying to get as much value out of as little money as they can. Inflation is entirely irrelevant in this calculation, so long as both parties are dependent on that third, unassailable economic force: the consumer, who is simply trying to get as much value for as little money as possible, also. (Most labor contracts I am familiar with that include COLAs are those of government workers, such as teachers, who are not dependent on the consumer, but rather the taxpayer and the voter; entirely different incentives apply.)

So as workers move from job to job, they will tend to go with the highest bidder, regardless of who that is. Someone who fails to get a raise he thinks he deserves may attempt to move to a different company. A company that finds its wages too high and finds themselves unable to lower those wages will tend to look for excuses to fire overpaid workers outright, replacing them with new workers with whom they can negotiate lower wages. Whether either party will be successful is ultimately not up to either the employers and the workers, regardless of whether or not they "understand" inflation, but to market conditions as dictated by the consumers.

However, "money illusion" will still tend to skew the economy. Downward wage rigidity is part of this. Consumer resistance to price rises is another. The "wealth effect", in which people tend to spend more when the monetary value of their assets rises despite the unchanged form of those assets, is another. All these forms of resistance will ultimately crumble in the long term, as market realities force reassessments; however, these "money illusion" phenomena do tend to transform what should be gradual changes over time into sudden and traumatic lurches, which skew perceptions and beliefs even more.

At this point in the book, the authors have failed to point out the source of money illusion. Some changes in prices simply reflect changes in consumer disposition: a price for one thing drops because consumers value it less today than they did yesterday, or because costs in producing this good have dropped; a price for another thing rises, because consumers value it more today than they did yesterday, or because production costs have risen. However, when ALL prices rise, it can only be because consumers value the money, itself, less today than they did yesterday, OR because the supply of money itself has risen. And there is only one entity with the power to increase the money supply to the degree it has over the twentieth century: the State. This "illusion" is not a natural phenomenon: it is man made. I hope to see Akerlof and Shiller point out this fact later in the book.

Historical Inflation Wave: From Spain to the Middle East

So I was contemplating the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Not ordinarily a thing one contemplates, but I'm taking a class on contemporary Middle East history, and I discovered a rather interesting theory. The influx of gold and silver from American through Spain (as they thoroughly looted the civilizations discovered there) resulted in an immense price rise throughout Europe. However, this price rise was not immediate and uniform, but proceeded, as it does, as the money moved through the economy of Europe. The following is just a speculative model, but it makes sense to me.

The Spanish government would have first tapped local market, and the influx of new money would have risen prices there. Merchants, recognizing the price differences between Spain and other places, would have taken to importing goods into Spain in order to profit from these price differences. Buy low in France, England, Germany, Italy, or wherever, and sell high in Spain. As a result, the areas from which the imports came would have developed export industries to take advantage of this opportunity, while Spain, though temporarily benefiting, would have developed a dependency on these imports.

The result would have been that the second tier of nations would now have well developed export industries, enabling them to profit from trade not only with Spain, but also each other once Spain's money ran out, more throughly. However, they would have also had higher prices than the next set of neighbors, which would have included the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and, with improved navigation, India, China, the American colonies, and the rest of the world. While having good export industries of their own, they would now be able to import other things they needed from these third tier countries... while Spain, now lacking either a price advantage or export industries, would go into a decline from which it would never fully recover.

The third tier, being pretty much the rest of the world, would have ended up developing some level of exports to the second tier countries, but would not have the opportunity to export their own increased price level to a fourth tier, there being no fourth tier. So rather than an outflow stimulating the development of exports, followed by an inflow as they stimulate someone else's exports, they would mostly just experience the outflow, but find that their newly earned money doesn't buy as much as it did when merchants brought it in.

Spain founded an empire on this flow, but became dependent on it when the money ran out. England, France, Germany, and the United States founded industrial economies on it to absorb currency from Spain, and then spent it out to the third tier, developing a balance of both export industries and import dependencies. The final tier would mostly just experience asymmetrical exports, but not have the opportunity to benefit from similarly asymmetrical imports. The inflater, Spain, was destroyed by this wave. The final absorber was similarly damaged.

At present, the United States is increasingly dependent on imports, without developing similar levels of exports (and going further and further into debt), all based on a globally dominant inflationary currency. Will the US go the way of Spain? Will US importers, such as China, Japan, Korea, India, and such go the way of England and the United States? Is the Third World even more screwed than they already are?

"Cost Push Inflation"

Something people like to talk about is things like rising oil prices "causing" "inflation". The idea is that there are certain commodities which are used in nearly every productive process, and as a result movements in the price of this commodity can influence the prices of just about every other commodity. Petroleum provides both the energy for many, many productive processes, the vast majority of the energy for transportation of products, and the raw materials for everything from the fertilizer used in growing the food to the plastics they are stored in. Because a rise in the price of oil causes a rise in the price of everything else (debatable, but I don't need to go there this time), it follows that The State is justified in engaging in collective action to keep these prices down. Or, another side goes, the prices being left as they are, a certain amount of the higher prices, inconveniencing people as they do, should be collected for the benefit of the state. Right?

I am, of course, referring to subsidies to the oil industry (up to and including war on the industry's behalf) on the one hand, and special taxation of the industry on the other. In addition, I am playing devils advocate here, for the sake of another argument. Certainly, subsidization of the oil industry (or any other) to bring prices down doesn't make sense because the money still has to come from somewhere; ie. taxes. In addition, seeking to reduce the profitability of a commodity will discourage the development of new sources of that commodity, keeping prices up in the long run. However, there is one other thing, an entire category, one of the factors of production, the price of which drives all other prices even more surely than the price of petroleum, but which is not subject to the same market dynamics of petroleum.

I am referring to land. Access to physical space is necessary for existence itself, let alone to the productive processes that support existence. Thus, the costs involved in occupying this physical space must be accounted for in the costs of production. This is true whether you're dealing with a business that is paying rent to an owner, a mortgage to a financial institution, the costs of physical security in a land where the State does not assume this burden, or even if the business owner is also the landowner and is simply paying out market norms for all the other factors, while keeping the surplus (including the rent) for himself. And even if one has found a way to make a living in a place neither tethered to ownable land nor threatened by criminal violence, one is only making use of marginal land... and if it is profitable, this land will not be marginal for long, as others move to imitate.

As an economy grows, the price of a given unit of land relative to the price of a unit of just about anything else grows. For while increasing economic efficiency enables people to get more out of smaller and smaller quantities of any given input, including land , the result is larger available quantities of every other input... but not land. One can squeeze more and more productivity out of a given area of land, which is good for those who own the land, since they can claim an ever larger quantity of goods and services in exchange for the use of their land.

And this increasing cost of access to land must ultimately come out in the prices of goods and services for production to be profitable. These price increases, furthermore, enter the cost of production at a multitude of points.

The minimum price of labor must account for land prices increases, since they affect the price of living space. This minimum price is also affected by food prices, which are affected by rising land prices. The price of everything the laborer must use is affected by land prices. This doesn't necessarily mean all these prices are rising in an absolute sense, but compare what prices are when efficiency increases are opposed by rises in land prices to what they could be if the cost of physical space were somehow magically removed, and you get an idea what I'm talking about here.

Then there's the price of capital goods: machines, facilities, goods on the shelf. All of those who produced these had to pay for access to land; therefore rising land prices affect the prices of these thigns, as well. And the inputs that went into producing the capital goods ALSO were impacted by rising land prices in the previous cycle.

All of this is in addition to the compensation for the landholder for permitting the land to be used by one individual rather than another. Clearly, land prices (or actually, the rental value of land, which impacts, but does not exclusively determine, the purchase prices of land titles) affect prices economy-wide to a degree equal to or greater than the price of oil. IF you happen to believe that goods with this degre of influence over other prices (like oil) fall under the purview of government regulation, taxation, and subsidy (and I admit, I do not share that belief, but work with me here), certainly land falls into this category.

When does this fact become most obvious? When domsetic producers are displaced by producers located in developing regions, the land in which has lower rental values due to things like a lower or less educated population, more frequent violence, less capital development, and overall factors that produced a lower historical degree of interest in developing in those lands. This will not last forever, since this disequlibrium of rental values will eventually stabilize... which is to say, eventually, developing country will become developed country, and what was once marginal land will be pulled into production.

Attempting to legislate rental values down would be foolish, since it is those prices that ensure that land, when it changes hands, goes into the hands of those most capable of making use of it. All you would end up doing is pushing rents into a black market. Because land, by definition, cannot be created, an attempt to stimulate production of land (increase supply) through subsidies is clearly not going to succeed. However, this same fact makes taxation of landholdings unable to reduce the availability of land; thus, unlike special oil taxes, land taxes cannot discourage future production.

For those of you who do not think this is enough to justify regulation and taxation, I will attempt, once again, to present the moral argument next week.